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Abstract
The Lova´sz extension of a pseudo-Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → R is defined on
each simplex of the standard triangulation of [0, 1]n as the unique affine function fˆ :
[0, 1]n → R that interpolates f at the n+1 vertices of the simplex. Its degree is that
of the unique multilinear polynomial that expresses f . In this paper we investigate
the least squares approximation problem of an arbitrary Lova´sz extension fˆ by
Lova´sz extensions of (at most) a specified degree. We derive explicit expressions
of these approximations. The corresponding approximation problem for pseudo-
Boolean functions was investigated by Hammer and Holzman [14] and then solved
explicitly by Grabisch, Marichal, and Roubens [11], giving rise to an alternative
definition of Banzhaf interaction index. Similarly we introduce a new interaction
index from approximations of fˆ and we present some of its properties. It turns out
that its corresponding power index identifies with the power index introduced by
Grabisch and Labreuche [10].
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1 Introduction and problem setting
Real valued set functions are extensively used in both cooperative game theory
and multicriteria decision making (see for instance [11] and the references
therein). Indeed, in its characteristic form, a cooperative game on a finite set
of players N := {1, . . . , n}, is a set function v : 2N → R such that v(∅) = 0
which assigns to each coalition S of players a real number v(S) representing
the worth of S. In multicriteria decision making, when N represents a set of
criteria, a capacity (also called non-additive measure) on N is a monotone set
function v : 2N → R such that v(∅) = 0 and v(N) = 1 which assigns to each
subset S of criteria its weight v(S).
There is a natural identification of real valued set functions v : 2N → R
with pseudo-Boolean functions f : {0, 1}n → R through the equality v(S) =
f(1S), where 1S denotes the characteristic vector of S in {0, 1}
n (whose ith
component is 1 if and only if i ∈ S). Moreover, it is known [15] that any pseudo-
Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → R has a unique expression as a multilinear
polynomial in n variables
f(x) =
∑
S⊆N
a(S)
∏
i∈S
xi, (1)
where the set function a : 2N → R is simply the Mo¨bius transform (see for
instance [21]) of v, which can be calculated through
a(S) =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)|S|−|T | v(T ). (2)
Let Sn denote the family of all permutations σ on N . The Lova´sz extension
fˆ : [0, 1]n → R of any pseudo-Boolean function f is defined on each n-simplex
Sσ := {x ∈ [0, 1]
n | xσ(1) 6 · · · 6 xσ(n)} (σ ∈ Sn),
as the unique affine function which interpolates f at the n + 1 vertices of Sσ
(see Lova´sz [17, §3] and Singer [24, §2]).
The concept of Lova´sz extension was initially used in combinatorial optimiza-
tion [8,17,24] and then in cooperative game theory [2,11]. In this paper we
are mostly concerned by the interpretation of this concept in decision mak-
ing, where it was observed in [18] that the Lova´sz extension of a monotone
pseudo-Boolean function is nothing but a discrete Choquet integral [4,5]. Re-
call that discrete Choquet integrals were recently proposed in decision making
as aggregation functions that generalize the weighted arithmetic means by the
taking into consideration of the interaction phenomena among input variables;
see for instance [12,19].
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As pointed out in Grabisch et al. [11], the Lova´sz extension of any pseudo-
Boolean function f can be expressed as the following min-polynomial
fˆ(x) =
∑
S⊆N
a(S) min
i∈S
xi.
Its degree is that of the multilinear polynomial (1) that expresses f .
Hammer and Holzman [14] investigated the approximation of a pseudo-Boolean
function f by a multilinear polynomial of (at most) a specified degree. More
precisely, fixing k ∈ N, with k 6 n, they defined the best kth approximation
of f as the multilinear polynomial fk : {0, 1}
n → R of degree at most k which
minimizes ∑
x∈{0,1}n
[f(x)− g(x)]2
among all multilinear polynomials g of degree at most k. They obtained an
explicit form of the solution for k = 1 and k = 2. For a general k, the explicit
form of the solution was obtained by Grabisch et al. [11, §7]. It is written as
fk(x) =
∑
S⊆N
|S|6k
ak(S)
∏
i∈S
xi,
where
ak(S) = a(S) + (−1)
k+|S|
∑
T⊇S
|T |>k
(
|T |−|S|−1
k−|S|
)
2|T |−|S|
a(T ). (3)
Hammer and Holzman [14] also noticed that a1({i}) identifies with the classical
Banzhaf power index [3] related to the ith player. More generally, Grabisch et
al. [11] noticed that, for any S ⊆ N , the coefficient a|S|(S) identifies with the
Banzhaf interaction index [22] related to the coalition S.
In this paper we investigate the least squares approximation of a given Lova´sz
extension fˆ by a min-polynomial of (at most) a specified degree. More pre-
cisely, fixing k ∈ N, with k 6 n, we give explicit formulas (see Section 2) for
the best kth approximation of fˆ , that is, the min-polynomial fˆk : [0, 1]
n → R
of degree at most k which minimizes∫
[0,1]n
[
fˆ(x)− gˆ(x)
]2
dx
among all min-polynomials gˆ of degree at most k.
It is important to emphasize that this least squares problem has a relevant
application in multicriteria decision making. Indeed, consider a multicriteria
decision making problem modelled by a Choquet integral and its underlying
capacity on a set of n criteria. It is sometimes useful to approximate this
Choquet integral (which is, actually, the Lova´sz extension of the capacity) by
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simpler aggregation functions such as Lova´sz extensions of degree k (k < n).
Indeed this subclass of functions includes the Choquet integrals constructed
from k-order capacities introduced by Grabisch [9].
By analogy with the Banzhaf interaction index obtained from the approxi-
mations of f , we show (see Section 3) that the approximations of fˆ give rise
to a new interaction index having appealing properties (see for instance [7]).
Furthermore, it turns out that its corresponding power index identifies with a
power index introduced axiomatically by Grabisch and Labreuche [10].
In order to avoid a heavy notation, cardinalities of subsets S, T, . . . are denoted
whenever possible by the corresponding lower case letters s, t, . . ., otherwise by
the standard notation |S|, |T |, . . . Also, for any S ⊆ N we define the function
minS : [0, 1]
n → R as
minS(x) := min
i∈S
xi,
with the convention that min∅ ≡ 1. Finally, we denote by FN the family of
set functions v : 2N → R.
2 Approximations of Lova´sz extensions
We first recall the setting of our approximation problem. For any k ∈ {0, . . . , n},
we denote by Vk the set of all min-polynomials fˆk : [0, 1]
n → R of degree at
most k, i.e., of the form
fˆk(x) =
∑
S⊆N
|S|6k
ak(S) min
i∈S
xi.
Definition 1 Let fˆ ∈ Vn and k ∈ {0, . . . , n}. The best kth approximation of
fˆ is the min-polynomial fˆk ∈ Vk that minimizes∫
[0,1]n
[
fˆ(x)− gˆ(x)
]2
dx
among all min-polynomials gˆ of Vk.
In this section we first discuss existence and uniqueness of the best kth ap-
proximation of any function fˆ ∈ Vn (see Proposition 3). Then we provide a
closed-form formula for this approximation (see Theorem 9).
We begin with the following straightforward proposition:
Proposition 2 For any k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, the set Vk is a linear subspace of
Vn, which in turn is a linear subspace of the space C0([0, 1]
n) of continuous
4
functions on [0, 1]n. Moreover, the set
Bk := {minS | S ⊆ N, s 6 k}, (4)
forms a basis of Vk and hence dim(Vk) =
∑k
s=0
(
n
s
)
.
Consider the usual inner product 〈· , ·〉 of C0([0, 1]
n) given by
〈f1, f2〉 :=
∫
[0,1]n
f1(x) f2(x) dx.
This clearly induces an inner product in Vn, which in turn allows to define a
norm ‖fˆ‖ := 〈fˆ , fˆ〉1/2 and then a distance d(fˆ1, fˆ2) := ‖fˆ1 − fˆ2‖ in Vn.
According to this terminology, the best kth approximation of fˆ ∈ Vn is the
solution fˆk of the following least squares problem
min{‖fˆ − gˆ‖2 | gˆ ∈ Vk},
which amounts to a classical orthogonal projection problem.
From now on, for any k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, we denote by Ak the orthogonal projector
from Vn onto Vk.
Proposition 3 For any fˆ ∈ Vn and any k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, the best kth approx-
imation of fˆ exists and is uniquely given by fˆk = Ak(fˆ). In particular, it is
characterized as the unique element fˆk of Vk such that fˆ − fˆk is orthogonal to
Vk, i.e., to each element of the basis Bk defined in (4).
This projection problem can be simplified because of the following result,
which immediately follows from the fact that the subspaces Vk are nested:
Proposition 4 The operators Ak, k = 0, . . . , n, are such that
k 6 k′ ⇒ Ak(Ak′(fˆ)) = Ak(fˆ). (5)
We thus observe that Ak(fˆ) can be attained from fˆ by successively carrying
out the projections An−1, An−2, . . . , Ak. We will therefore search for the rela-
tion that links any two consecutive projections. This relation will enable us to
compute gradually Ak(fˆ) from fˆ .
Remark 5 Fix k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} and assume that fˆk+1 = Ak+1(fˆ) is given.
By (5), Ak(fˆ) is the orthogonal projection of Ak+1(fˆ) onto Vk and by Propo-
sition 3, it is given as the unique solution fˆk ∈ Vk of the following system
〈fˆk,minS〉 = 〈fˆk+1,minS〉 (S ⊆ N, s 6 k).
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To solve this projection problem, we need the following two lemmas. The first
one yields an explicit expression of the inner product 〈minS,minT 〉 of any two
elements of Bn. The second lemma, which makes use of the first one, yields
an explicit expression of the projections onto Vk of the elements of Bk+1 \Bk.
Lemma 6 For any S, T ⊆ N , there holds
∫
[0,1]n
minS(x)minT (x) dx =
1
|S ∪ T |+ 2
(
1
s+ 1
+
1
t+ 1
)
. (6)
Proof. See Appendix A. ✷
Lemma 7 For any S ⊆ N , with s = k + 1, we have
Ak(minS) =
∑
T S
(−1)k+t
(
k+t+1
k+1
)
(
2k+2
k+1
) minT .
Proof. See Appendix B. ✷
Proposition 8 Let k ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. Given the coefficients ak+1(S) of
Ak+1(fˆ), the coefficients ak(S) of Ak(fˆ) are given by
ak(S) = ak+1(S) + (−1)
k+s
(
k+s+1
k+1
)
(
2k+2
k+1
) ∑
T⊇S
t=k+1
ak+1(T ). (7)
Proof. Using formula (5) and then Lemma 7, we obtain
Ak(fˆ)=Ak(Ak+1(fˆ)) =
∑
S⊆N
s6k+1
ak+1(S)Ak(minS)
=
∑
S⊆N
s6k
ak+1(S)minS +
∑
S⊆N
s=k+1
ak+1(S)Ak(minS)
=
∑
S⊆N
s6k
ak+1(S)minS +
∑
S⊆N
s=k+1
ak+1(S)
∑
T S
(−1)k+t
(
k+t+1
k+1
)
(
2k+2
k+1
) minT ,
which proves the result. ✷
We are now ready to derive the explicit form of the coefficients of Ak(fˆ) in
terms of the coefficients of fˆ . It is worth comparing this formula with the
solution (3) of the Hammer-Holzman approximation problem.
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Theorem 9 Let k ∈ {0, . . . , n}. The coefficients of Ak(fˆ) are given from
those of fˆ by
ak(S) = a(S) + (−1)
k+s
∑
T⊇S
t>k
(
k+s+1
k+1
)(
t−s−1
k−s
)
(
k+t+1
k+1
) a(T ). (8)
Proof. We only have to prove that the coefficients ak(S) given in (8) fulfill
the recurrence relation (7).
Let k ∈ {0, . . . , n} and fix S ⊆ N with s 6 k. By substituting (8) into (7), we
obtain, after removing the common term a(S),
(−1)k+s
∑
R⊇S
r>k
(
k+s+1
k+1
)(
r−s−1
k−s
)
(
k+r+1
k+1
) a(R)
= (−1)k+s+1
∑
R⊇S
r>k+1
(
k+s+2
k+2
)(
r−s−1
k−s+1
)
(
k+r+2
k+2
) a(R)
+ (−1)k+s
(
k+s+1
k+1
)
(
2k+2
k+1
) ∑
T⊇S
t=k+1
[
a(T ) +
∑
R⊇T
r>k+1
(
2k+3
k+2
)
(
k+r+2
k+2
) a(R)
]
.
Let us show that this equality holds. Dividing through by (−1)k+s and then
removing the terms corresponding to a(R), with r = k + 1, the equality be-
comes
∑
R⊇S
r>k+1
(
k+s+1
k+1
)(
r−s−1
k−s
)
(
k+r+1
k+1
) a(R)
= −
∑
R⊇S
r>k+1
(
k+s+2
k+2
)(
r−s−1
k−s+1
)
(
k+r+2
k+2
) a(R) + ∑
R⊇S
r>k+1
(
k+s+1
k+1
)(
2k+3
k+2
)(
r−s
k−s+1
)
(
2k+2
k+1
)(
k+r+2
k+2
) a(R).
Fix R ⊇ S, with r > k + 1, and consider the coefficients of a(R) in the
previous equality. By equating them, we obtain an identity which can be easily
checked. ✷
Example 10 Let fˆ : [0, 1]4 → R be given by
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fˆ(x)=
3
10
(
x1 + x2 + x3 +min{x1, x2}+min{x1, x3}+min{x2, x3}
)
−
21
25
min{x1, x2, x3}+
1
25
min{x1, x2, x3, x4}.
The best constant approximation is given by
(A0fˆ)(x) =
137
250
,
the best linear approximation by
(A1fˆ)(x) =
1
100
+
89
250
(x1 + x2 + x3) +
1
125
x4
and the best min-quadratic approximation by
(A2fˆ)(x) =−
27
700
+
803
1750
(x1 + x2 + x3)−
8
875
x4
−
19
175
(
min{x1, x2}+min{x1, x3}+min{x2, x3}
)
+
2
175
(
min{x1, x4}+min{x2, x4}+min{x3, x4}
)
.
Before closing this section, we show that every approximation preserves the
symmetry properties of the functions. For instance, in the previous example,
we observe that the function fˆ and all its approximations are symmetric in
the variables x1, x2, and x3.
Let us establish this result in a more general setting. Let X be a nonempty
closed convex set in a finite-dimensional inner product space V . For any u ∈ V ,
the distance between u and X is achieved at a unique point in X . We denote
this point by AX(u) and call it the projection of u onto X (see for instance
[16, Chap. 3, §3.1]).
Lemma 11 Let I : V → V be an isometry such that I(X) = X. Then I and
AX commute, i.e., I ◦ AX = AX ◦ I.
Proof. We clearly have I[AX(u)] ∈ X for any u ∈ V . Furthermore, for any
v ∈ X , we have
‖I(u)− I[AX(u)]‖ = ‖u− AX(u)‖ 6 ‖u− v‖ = ‖I(u)− I(v)‖,
which shows that I[AX(u)] is the projection of I(u) onto X . ✷
Let us now apply this result to our least squares approximation problem.
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Definition 12 For any σ in Sn, we define the linear operator Pσ of Vn as
Pσfˆ(x1, . . . , xn) := fˆ(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(n)).
We say that σ ∈ Sn is a symmetry of fˆ if Pσ(fˆ) = fˆ .
Proposition 13 For any σ ∈ Sn, the operator Pσ is an isometry of Vn such
that Pσ(Vk) = Vk. In particular, the operators Pσ and Ak commute and Ak
preserves the symmetries of its arguments.
Proof. It is clear that Pσ(Vk) = Vk and that Pσ is an isometry, i.e., it satisfies
〈Pσfˆ , Pσgˆ〉 = 〈fˆ , gˆ〉 (fˆ , gˆ ∈ Vn).
Therefore, by Lemma 11, Pσ and Ak commute. In particular, if σ ∈ Sn is a
symmetry of fˆ , then
Pσ[Ak(fˆ)] = Ak[Pσ(fˆ)] = Ak(fˆ)
and hence σ is also a symmetry of Ak(fˆ). ✷
3 A new interaction index
In cooperative game theory the concept of power index (or value) was intro-
duced in the pioneering work of Shapley [23]. Roughly speaking, a power index
on N is a function φ : FN × N → R that assigns to every player i ∈ N in
a game v ∈ FN his/her prospect φ(v, i) from playing the game. The Shapley
power index of a player i ∈ N in a game v ∈ FN is given by
φSh(v, i) :=
∑
T⊆N\{i}
1
n
(
n− 1
t
)−1
[v(T ∪ {i})− v(T )].
Another frequently used power index is the Banzhaf power index [3,6] which,
for a player i ∈ N in a game v ∈ FN , is defined by
φB(v, i) :=
∑
T⊆N\{i}
1
2n−1
[v(T ∪ {i})− v(T )].
The concept of interaction index, which is an extension of that of power index,
was recently introduced axiomatically to measure the interaction phenomena
among players. An interaction index on N is essentially a function I : FN ×
2N → R that assigns to every coalition S ⊆ N of players in a game v ∈ FN
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its interaction degree. Various interaction indices have been introduced thus
far in the literature: the Shapley interaction index [9], the Banzhaf interaction
index [13,22], and the chaining interaction index [20], which all belong to
the class of cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices (see Definition 14 below)
newly axiomatized in [7].
For instance, the Banzhaf interaction index on N , which extends the concept
of Banzhaf power index on N , is the mapping IB : FN × 2
N → R defined by
IB(v, S) :=
∑
T⊆N\S
1
2n−s
∆Sv(T ),
where ∆Sv(T ) is the S-derivative of v at T defined for any disjoint subsets
S, T ⊆ N by
∆Sv(T ) :=
∑
R⊆S
(−1)s−r v(R ∪ T ). (9)
This index can be easily expressed in terms of the Mo¨bius transform (2) of v
as
IB(v, S) =
∑
T⊇S
1
2t−s
a(T ).
It is noteworthy that, besides the axiomatic approach presented in [13,22],
the Banzhaf interaction index can also be defined from the Hammer-Holzman
approximation problem. Indeed, as pointed out in [14] and [11, §7], by con-
sidering the leading coefficients in (3) of the best sth approximation, for all
s = 0, . . . , n, we immediately observe that
IB(v, S) = as(S).
In this section we use the same approach to define a new interaction index
from our approximation problem of Lova´sz extensions. In this sense this new
index can be seen as an analog of the Banzhaf interaction index.
Before going on, we recall the concept of cardinal-probabilistic interaction
index [7].
Definition 14 A cardinal-probabilistic interaction index on N is a mapping
Ip : FN × 2
N → R such that, for any S ⊆ N , there is a family of nonnegative
real numbers {pst(n)}t=0,...,n−s satisfying
∑n−s
t=0 p
s
t(n) = 1, such that
Ip(v, S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
pst (n)∆Sv(T ). (10)
It has been proved [7, §4] that a mapping Ip : FN × 2
N → R of the form (10)
is a cardinal-probabilistic interaction index on N if and only if, for any integer
10
s ∈ {0, . . . , n}, there exists a uniquely determined cumulative distribution
function Fs on [0, 1] such that
pst (n) =
∫ 1
0
xt(1− x)n−s−t dFs(x). (11)
Moreover, defining qst := p
s
t−s(t) =
∫ 1
0 x
t−s dFs(x) for all integers s, t such that
0 6 s 6 t 6 n, we have
Ip(v, S) =
∑
T⊇S
qst a(T ). (12)
The following lemma provides conditions on arbitrary coefficients qst so that a
mapping of the form (12) can be a cardinal-probabilistic interaction index.
Lemma 15 Consider an infinite sequence {qst }t>s>0. Then the following three
conditions are equivalent:
(i) we have
∑m
i=0(−1)
i
(
m
i
)
qst+i > 0 for all m > 0 and all t > s > 0,
(ii) there is a unique cumulative distribution function Fs on [0, 1] such that, for
any integer t > s > 0,
qst =
∫ 1
0
xt−s dFs(x),
(iii) for any N = {1, . . . , n}, the function Ip : FN × 2
N → R, defined in (12) is
a cardinal-probabilistic interaction index.
Moreover, when these conditions are satisfied, then the mapping Ip : FN ×
2N → R, defined in (12), is of the form (10) and the coefficients qst and p
s
t (n)
are linked through qst = p
s
t−s(t) and
pst(n) =
n∑
i=s+t
(−1)i−s−t
(
n− s− t
i− s− t
)
qsi .
Proof. (i)⇔ (ii) Follows immediately from the Hausdorff’s moment problem
(see for instance Akhiezer [1, Theorem 2.6.4]).
(ii)⇒ (iii) Rewriting (12) in terms of v gives
Ip(v, S) =
∑
J⊇S
qsj
∑
L⊆J
(−1)j−lv(L).
Partitioning L ⊆ J into R ⊆ S and T ⊆ J \ S and then using (9), we obtain
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Ip(v, S)=
∑
T⊆N\S
[ ∑
J⊇S∪T
(−1)j−s−tqsj
] ∑
R⊆S
(−1)s−r v(R ∪ T )
=
∑
T⊆N\S
pst (n)∆Sv(T ),
where the coefficients pst(n) are given by
pst (n) =
n∑
j=s+t
(−1)j−s−t
(
n− s− t
j − s− t
)
qsj =
∫ 1
0
xt(1− x)n−s−t dFs(x),
which shows that Ip is a cardinal-probabilistic interaction index.
(iii)⇒ (ii) According to formula (12), we have
Ip(v, S) =
∑
T⊇S
qst a(T ) =
∑
T⊇S
[ ∫ 1
0
xt−s dFs(x)
]
a(T ),
which completes the proof by uniqueness of this decomposition. ✷
We are now ready to introduce our new interaction index, namely the mapping
IM : FN × 2
N → R : (v, S) 7→ IM(v, S) = as(S),
where as(S) are the leading coefficients in (8) of the best sth approximation
of fˆ , for all s = 0, . . . , n.
This immediately leads to the following equivalent definition, which makes use
of the classical beta function
B(a, b) :=
∫ 1
0
ua−1(1− u)b−1 du (a, b > 0).
Definition 16 For any N = {1, . . . , n}, we define the mapping IM : FN ×
2N → R as
IM(v, S) =
∑
T⊇S
qst a(T ),
where qst :=
(2s+1s+1 )
(s+t+1s+1 )
= B(t+1,s+1)
B(s+1,s+1)
for all t > s > 0.
By using Lemma 15, we can easily show that IM is a cardinal-probabilistic
interaction index.
Proposition 17 The function IM : FN × 2
N → R is a cardinal-probabilistic
interaction index, given by
IM(v, S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
pst (n)∆S v(T ),
12
where pst (n) :=
B(n−t+1,s+t+1)
B(s+1,s+1)
.
Proof. We immediately observe that Lemma 15 applies with the beta distri-
bution
Fs(x) =
∫ x
0 u
s(1− u)s du
B(s+ 1, s+ 1)
.
Indeed, we have
∫ 1
0
xt−s dFs(x) =
1
B(s + 1, s+ 1)
∫ 1
0
xt(1− x)s dx = qst .
The expression of the coefficients pst (n) then follows immediately from (11). ✷
The following proposition shows that the mapping v 7→ (IM(v, S))S⊆N is in-
vertible and yields the transformation formula from (IM(v, S))S⊆N to a =
(a(S))S⊆N .
Proposition 18 For any S ⊆ N , we have
a(S) =
∑
T⊇S
hst IM(v, T ).
with
hst = (−1)
t−s
(
s+t
t
)
(
2t
t
) .
Proof. We only need to show that
∑
T⊇S
qst
∑
R⊇T
htr IM(v, R) = IM(v, S).
We have
∑
T⊇S
qst
∑
R⊇T
htr IM(v, R) =
∑
R⊇S
IM(v, R)
∑
T :S⊆T⊆R
qst h
t
r,
where the inner sum equals 1 if S = R and 0 if S  R. Indeed, in the latter
case, we have
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∑
T :S⊆T⊆R
qst h
t
r =
(
2s+1
s+1
)
(
2r
r
) (s+ 1)!
r!
r∑
t=s
(−1)r−t
(
r − s
t− s
)
(r + t)!
(s+ t + 1)!
=
(
2s+1
s+1
)
(
2r
r
) (s+ 1)!
r!
r∑
t=s
(−1)r−t
(
r − s
t− s
)[
dr−s−1
dxr−s−1
xr+t
]
x=1
=
(
2s+1
s+1
)
(
2r
r
) (s+ 1)!
r!
[
dr−s−1
dxr−s−1
xr+s(x− 1)r−s
]
x=1
=0. ✷
In order to conclude, we focus on the power index associated to IM . The
following corollary shows that, incidentally, this power index identifies with the
index Wi(fˆ) previously introduced axiomatically by Grabisch and Labreuche
[10, Theorem 2] in the context of multicriteria decision making.
Corollary 19 The restriction of IM(v, ·) to singletons is given by:
IM(v, {i}) =
∑
T⊆N\{i}
6(n− t)!(t + 1)!
(n+ 2)!
[v(T ∪ {i})− v(T )].
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 6
Observe first that we can assume that S and T are such that |S ∪ T | = n.
Moreover, suppose that S and T are nonempty. Remark that [0, 1]n is equal
almost everywhere to the disjoint union of the sets
S◦σ := {x ∈ [0, 1]
n | xσ(1) < · · · < xσ(n)} (σ ∈ Sn).
Then we have ∫
[0,1]n
minS(x)minT (x) dx =
∑
σ∈Sn
Iσ, (13)
where
Iσ :=
∫
S◦σ
minS(x)minT (x) dx (σ ∈ Sn),
Now, define for every R ⊆ N and p ∈ {1, . . . , |R|} the set
S
(p)
n (R) := {σ ∈ Sn | σ(1), . . . , σ(p) ∈ R, σ(p+ 1) 6∈ R}.
It is then clear that there is a decomposition of Sn into disjoint subsets
Sn =
[
Sn(S ∩ T )
]
∪
[ n−t⋃
p=1
S
(p)
n (S \ T )
]
∪
[ n−s⋃
p=1
S
(p)
n (T \ S)
]
, (14)
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where
Sn(S ∩ T ) := {σ ∈ Sn | σ(1) ∈ S ∩ T}.
Moreover we have


|Sn(S ∩ T )| = |S ∩ T | (n− 1)!
|S(p)n (S \ T )| =
(
n−t
p
)
p! t (n− p− 1)! .
Indeed, every element of Sn(S ∩ T ) corresponds to a choice of σ(1) in S ∩ T ,
and a permutation of the remaining elements in N . In the same fashion, every
element of S(p)n (S \ T ) is determined by the choice of p elements in S \ T ,
a permutation of these elements, the choice of a single element in T and a
permutation of the remaining elements. Moreover, for any σ ∈ Sn(S ∩ T ), we
have
Iσ =
∫ 1
0
∫ xσ(n)
0
· · ·
∫ xσ(2)
0
x2σ(1) dxσ(1) · · · dxσ(n) =
2
(n+ 2)!
,
and ∑
σ∈Sn(S∩T )
Iσ =
2 |S ∩ T | (n− 1)!
(n+ 2)!
=
2 (s+ t− n)
n(n + 1)(n+ 2)
. (15)
In the same way, for any σ ∈ S(p)n (S \ T ), we have
Iσ =
∫ 1
0
∫ xσ(n)
0
· · ·
∫ xσ(p+2)
0
xσ(p+1)
∫ xσ(p+1)
0
· · ·
∫ xσ(2)
0
xσ(1) dxσ(1) · · · dxσ(n)
=
p+ 2
(n+ 2)!
,
and
n−t∑
p=1
∑
σ∈S
(p)
n (S\T )
Iσ =
t
(n + 2)!
n−t∑
p=1
(
n− t
p
)
p! (n− p− 1)! (p+ 2)
=
t! (n− t)!
(n+ 2)!
n−t∑
p=1
(
n− p− 1
t− 1
)
(p+ 2)
=
t! (n− t)!
(n+ 2)!
[
(n + 2)
n−t∑
p=1
(
n− p− 1
t− 1
)
− t
n−t∑
p=1
(
n− p
t
)]
=
t! (n− t)!
(n+ 2)!
[
(n + 2)
(
n− 1
t
)
− t
(
n
t + 1
)]
,
that is,
n−t∑
p=1
∑
σ∈S
(p)
n (S\T )
Iσ =
(n− t)(n+ 2t+ 2)
n(n+ 1)(n+ 2)(t+ 1)
. (16)
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Similarly, we can write
n−s∑
p=1
∑
σ∈S
(p)
n (T\S)
Iσ =
(n− s)(n+ 2s+ 2)
n(n+ 1)(n+ 2)(s+ 1)
(17)
and by Eqs. (13)–(17), we have
∫
[0,1]n
minS(x)minT (x) dx=
∑
σ∈Sn(S∩T )
Iσ +
n−t∑
p=1
∑
σ∈S
(p)
n (S\T )
Iσ +
n−s∑
p=1
∑
σ∈S
(p)
n (T\S)
Iσ
=
s+ t+ 2
(n+ 2)(s+ 1)(t+ 1)
as desired. We can easily see that the result still holds if S = ∅ or T = ∅. ✷
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 7
We only have to prove that the explicit expression we give for Ak(minS) fulfills
the conditions of Proposition 3, namely,
〈
minS −Ak(minS), minT
〉
= 0 (T ⊆ N, t 6 k),
or, equivalently,
∑
J⊆S
IJ,T (−1)
k+j
(
k + j + 1
k + 1
)
= 0 (T ⊆ N, t 6 k), (18)
where IJ,T := 〈minJ ,minT 〉 is given explicitly in (6).
Partitioning J ⊆ S into P ⊆ S \ T and Q ⊆ R with R := S ∩ T (hence
r 6 t 6 k), the left-hand side of (18) becomes
∑
P⊆S\T
∑
Q⊆R
IP∪Q,T (−1)
k+p+q
(
k + p+ q + 1
k + 1
)
=
k−r+1∑
p=0
(
k − r + 1
p
)
r∑
q=0
(
r
q
)
p+ q + t+ 2
(p+ t + 2)(p+ q + 1)(t+ 1)
(−1)k+p+q
(
k + p+ q + 1
k + 1
)
=−
k−r+1∑
p=0
(
k − r + 1
p
)
(−1)k−r+1−p
1
p+ t+ 2
r∑
q=0
(
r
q
)
(−1)r−q g(p+ q)
where g : N→ R is defined by
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g(z) =
z + t + 2
(z + 1)(t+ 1)
(
z + k + 1
k + 1
)
=
1
k + 1
(
z + k + 1
k
)
+
1
t+ 1
(
z + k + 1
k + 1
)
.
Consider the difference operator
∆n f(n) := f(n+ 1)− f(n)
for functions on N. It is well-known that we have
∆kn f(n) =
k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
(−1)k−j f(n+ j) (k ∈ N). (19)
Applying this to g, we obtain
r∑
q=0
(
r
q
)
(−1)r−q g(p+ q) = ∆rp g(p) =
1
k + 1
(
p+ k + 1
k − r
)
+
1
t + 1
(
p+ k + 1
k − r + 1
)
and the left-hand side of (18) becomes
−
k−r+1∑
p=0
(
k − r + 1
p
)
(−1)k−r+1−p
1
p+ t+ 2
(
1
k + 1
(
p+ k + 1
k − r
)
+
1
t+ 1
(
p+ k + 1
k − r + 1
))
.
Applying (19) again, we see that this latter expression can be written as
−

∆k−r+1z 1z + t + 2
(
1
k + 1
(
z + k + 1
k − r
)
+
1
t+ 1
(
z + k + 1
k − r + 1
))
z=0
.
We now show that the expression in brackets is identically zero. We do this
by considering two cases:
• If t = k then
1
z + t+ 2
(
1
k + 1
(
z + k + 1
k − r
)
+
1
t+ 1
(
z + k + 1
k − r + 1
))
=
1
(k + 1)(z + k + 2)
(
z + k + 2
k − r + 1
)
=
1
(k + 1)(k − r + 1)
(
z + k + 1
k − r
)
is a polynomial Pk−r(z) of degree k − r, and ∆
k−r+1
z Pk−r(z) ≡ 0.
• If r 6 t 6 k − 1 then
1
z + t+ 2
(
1
k + 1
(
z + k + 1
k − r
)
+
1
t+ 1
(
z + k + 1
k − r + 1
))
=
1
z + t+ 2
(
1
(k + 1)(k − r)!
k+1∏
i=r+2
(z + i) +
1
(t + 1)(k − r + 1)!
k+1∏
i=r+1
(z + i)
)
17
is a polynomial Qk−r(z) of degree k − r, and ∆
k−r+1
z Qk−r(z) ≡ 0. ✷
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